

Chapter 5

TreeSwap: Efficient Swap Regret Minimization

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So far, we have seen that no-regret learning, and efficient equilibrium computation, are essentially possible whenever the set of deviations Φ is “efficiently representable”, in particular, whenever *external* regret minimization is possible over Φ . What about beyond? In particular, we have not yet addressed the *strongest* possible notion of Φ -regret, namely, the case where Φ contains *all* functions $\varphi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ —known as *swap regret*.

The fact that algorithms for Φ -regret minimization grow increasingly complex as Φ itself grows in complexity may lead one to believe that efficient swap regret minimization is hopeless. For example, the set of all functions $\varphi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ has *infinite* dimension, so the techniques we have covered so far do not work. If \mathcal{X} is a polytope, we could run the Blum-Mansour algorithm over its vertices—this would indeed succeed, but it has the drawback that the number of vertices of \mathcal{X} is generally not polynomial in the dimension d of \mathcal{X} , and hence the algorithm is not efficient. Hence, for a long time, the possibility of swap regret minimization—and correspondingly, correlated equilibrium computation beyond normal-form games—remained a major open question.

The question has since essentially been fully resolved. In a simultaneous major breakthrough, Peng and Rubinstein [PR24] and Dagan, Daskalakis, Fishelson and Golowich [DDFS24], using essentially an identical algorithm now known as **TreeSwap**, showed that, if there is a regret minimizer on \mathcal{X} that achieves *external* regret ϵ after M rounds, then there is a regret minimizer on \mathcal{X} that achieves ϵT *swap* regret after $M^{1/\epsilon}$ rounds, and therefore efficient swap regret minimization *is* in fact possible, at least when ϵ is a constant. They also showed nearly-matching lower bounds for normal-form games, which Daskalakis, Farina, Golowich, Sandholm and Zhang [DFG+24] later extended to extensive-form games as well, thereby precluding the possibility of $\text{poly}(d, 1/\epsilon)$ -time algorithms for swap regret beyond normal-form games. In this chapter, we will go over the upper bound.

5.1 The TreeSwap Algorithm

We now describe the **TreeSwap** algorithm, following Peng and Rubinstein [PR24] and Dagan, Daskalakis, Fishelson and Golowich [DDFS24]. Let \mathcal{R} be a no-regret algorithm on \mathcal{X} whose

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regret is bounded by ϵT after M rounds. Of course, \mathcal{R} will not necessarily have small swap regret. So, how can we hope to bound swap regret?

One thing to try might be the following. Instead of having \mathcal{R} update its strategy on *every* iteration, it will be lazy, and only update its strategy every M iterations, using the average utility on those M iterations. That is, at time M , it receives utility $\frac{1}{M} \sum_{t=1}^M \mathbf{u}^{(t)}$, at time $2M$ it receives utility $\frac{1}{M} \sum_{t=M+1}^{2M} \mathbf{u}^{(t)}$, and so on. Then, between those M iterations, that is, while \mathcal{R} is playing the same strategy, we initialize *another copy of the same regret minimizer*, which we will call \mathcal{R}' , which updates its strategy on *every* iteration.

The purpose of \mathcal{R}' is to bound the value of the most profitable deviation from every single strategy that \mathcal{R} plays. Therefore, \mathcal{R}' can ensure that no strategy played by \mathcal{R} incurs large swap regret. Of course, \mathcal{R}' itself will have high swap regret... but this can be solved by introducing yet more layers!

The **TreeSwap** algorithm uses K layers of regret minimizers $\mathcal{R}_0, \dots, \mathcal{R}_{K-1}$, each responsible for ensuring that there is no profitable swap deviation for the regret minimizers in the next layer. \mathcal{R}_0 updates on every iteration. Each regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_k updates M times slower than the previous regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_{k-1} , and resets every M updates. Hence, this algorithm runs for M^K steps. The strategy output by **TreeSwap** is the uniform distribution (not to be confused with the average) over the strategies $(\mathbf{x}_0^{(t)}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{K-1}^{(t)})$ output by the K regret minimizers. For simplicity of notation, we will zero-index timesteps and use the notation $[n] = \{0, \dots, n-1\}$.

Algorithm: TreeSwap

Input: Regret minimizers $\mathcal{R}_1, \dots, \mathcal{R}_K$

for timesteps $t \in [T] := [M^K]$ **do**

for layers $k \in [K]$ **do**

if $M^{k+1} \mid t$ **then** reset \mathcal{R}_k

else if $M^k \mid t$ **then** pass to \mathcal{R}_k the average of the last M^k utilities,

$$\frac{1}{M^k} \sum_{\tau=t-M^k}^{t-1} \mathbf{u}^{(\tau)}$$

$\mathbf{x}_k^{(t)} \leftarrow$ current strategy of \mathcal{R}_k

 play mixed strategy $\text{Unif}(\mathbf{x}_0^{(t)}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{K-1}^{(t)}) \in \Delta(\mathcal{X})$

 receive utility $\mathbf{u}^{(t)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$

Theorem 5.1. The regret of **TreeSwap** is bounded by $T \cdot (\epsilon + 1/K)$. In particular, taking $K = 1/\epsilon$ and $M = \text{poly}(d, 1/\epsilon)$ (as is achieved by any reasonable external-regret-minimizing algorithm), **TreeSwap** achieves swap regret ϵT after $M^K = d^{\tilde{O}(1/\epsilon)}$ iterations.

Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.1 only applies when T is a power of M . Handling the case where T is not a power of M requires a bit of care and results in a looser bound of $T \cdot (\epsilon + 3/K)$, but the main ideas are captured by the above result and its proof. [DDFS24]

Remark 5.3. We are mainly interested in the implications of Theorem 5.1 for its implications for swap regret in high-dimensional settings. However, it is worth noting that Theorem 5.1 achieves a new result even in the normal-form setting: its regret bound for normal form, when instantiated with multiplicative weights, is $\log(N)^{\tilde{O}(1/\epsilon)}$, which, for large N and ϵ , is better than the bound of Blum-Mansour.

We now sketch a proof of Theorem 5.1.

Proof Sketch. In this proof, timesteps are zero-indexed, and $[n] := \{0, \dots, n-1\}$. Let $\varphi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ be any function. Then the (time-averaged) regret against φ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{T} \text{Reg}(T, \varphi) &= \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \mathbb{E}_{t \in [T]} \langle \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \varphi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(t)}) \rangle - \langle \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \mathbf{x}_k^{(t)} \rangle \\ &= \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \mathbb{E}_{t \in [T]} \langle \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \varphi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(t)}) \rangle - \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{E}_{t \in [T]} \langle \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \mathbf{x}_{k-1}^{(t)} \rangle \\ &= \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{t \in [T]} \langle \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \varphi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(t)}) - \mathbf{x}_{k-1}^{(t)} \rangle}_{\leq \epsilon} + \frac{1}{K} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{t \in [T]} \langle \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \varphi(\mathbf{x}_0^{(t)}) - \mathbf{x}_{K-1}^{(t)} \rangle}_{\leq 1} \\ &\leq \epsilon + \frac{1}{K} \end{aligned}$$

where, in the second-to-last line, the bound on the first term comes from the regret bound of each phase between resets (of length M updates), noting that $\varphi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(t)})$ is constant within any given phase and thus the regret against $\varphi(\mathbf{x}_k^{(t)})$ is bounded by the external regret during the phase. \square

Bibliography for this chapter

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